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We develop a model of capital tax/subsidy competition in which imperfectly competitive 
firms choose both the number and the location of the plants they operate.  The 
endogenous presence of horizontal multinationals is shown to attenuate the “race to the 
bottom” and yields some results that are opposite to traditional findings in the tax 
competition literature. First, in the presence of horizontal multinationals, increasing 
subsidies decrease firms' profits by exacerbating price competition due to more firms 
‘going multinational’. Second, instead of being always subsidized, capital may actually 
be taxed in equilibrium. Third, taxes/subsidies become strategically independent policy 
instruments, instead of being strategic complements. Last, there may exist multiple 
equilibria with either low or high subsidies. 
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 1 Introduction
National governments and local promotion agencies pervasively use targeted tax incen-
tives, domestic infrastructure, and local skill development to attract mobile capital and
to channel foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) 
ows. As a result, it is generally
believed that governments' non-cooperative behavior may get them caught in a `race to
the bottom': the tax game yields ineciently low capital taxes and/or overly generous
investment subsidies, with total state contribution sometimes matching up to 30% of
the investments.1 This situation makes a case for international cooperation and harmo-
nization of capital tax and investment subsidy policies. Yet, although the investment
sensitivity with respect to scal advantages seems to be a robust empirical fact (see Cum-
mins and Hubbard, 1995; Hines 1996), recent empirical ndings mitigate the thesis of
a `race to the bottom' tax game between industrialized nations. Indeed, while OECD
countries have observed a sharp decline in trade barriers, accompanied by even larger
cross-country investment 
ows, during the 1980s and 90s, both eective marginal tax
rates and tax revenues have remained rather stable over that period (e.g., Devereux et
al., 2002). At the same time, empirical studies support the view of insignicant capital
mobility between domestic and foreign locations, which suggests that multinational com-
panies do not simply close their home production facilities to invest in foreign based ones
(e.g., Devereux and Freeman, 1995).
These empirical facts qualify the traditional ndings of the literature on tax compe-
tition that studies the impact of factor mobility on tax revenue and welfare. Indeed, its
results generally support the idea that taxes are strategic complements, as a tax cut by
one country triggers tax cuts by the others, thus giving rise to a `race to the bottom' as
governments are enticed to unduly cut taxes to attract the tax bases of other countries
(e.g., Oates 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson 1986; Wildasin 1988). Recent
developments in this eld, notably in the context of international trade theory and new
economic geography, have analyzed the role of trade barriers and transport costs on rms'
location and tax competition (e.g., Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman,
2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and P
 uger, 2006). This strand of liter-
ature explains the observed persistence of high tax rates in large regions by the presence
of agglomeration rents that governments are able to tax away. Yet, by considering rms
with a single production facility only, this literature overlooks the issue of FDI as a means
to gain better market access, that has been emphasized in international trade theory. Be-
1For example, total state nancial inventives for the Mercedes-Benz/Swatch automobile plant in Ham-
bach, France, amounted to US$111 million, for a total company investment of US$370 million (Ra, 2004,
p.2747). Carlton (2003) provides a detailed overview of many cases in which there is international subsidy
competition between governments.
2cause it assumes that rms are not allowed to alter their production structures in response
to scal changes, this literature fails to discuss the important trade-o between market
proximity and production scale that multinational companies face (Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004).2 The objective of the present paper is to ll this gap by analyzing the
impact of endogenous horizontal multinationals on tax competition.
In this paper, we show that governments' competition for capital and investment
does not necessarily lead to a `race to the bottom' when one considers the possibility
of horizontal FDI, by which rms may invest abroad in additional production facilities.
As the main share of foreign investments in industrialized countries consists of horizontal
FDI, the present paper lends support to the empirical evidence of stable eective tax rates
and weak substitutability between home and foreign investments. To illustrate this point,
we develop a two-country model of capital tax/subsidy competition in which mobile rms
endogenously choose both their location and production structure. As in the paper by
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), all rms sell their products in both countries and face
trade costs for international shipments. They hence choose to operate a single plant in one
of the two countries when transport costs or trade barriers are small, whereas they build a
second plant and incur additional xed costs in the opposite case. Firms operating only a
single plant are called `exporters', whereas those operating multiple plants are horizontal
multinationals, which we simply refer to as `multinationals'. Utilitarian governments oer
subsidies (or tax credits) to attract rms and to increase their residents' consumption
surplus and prot claims.
We show that the outcome of the tax competition game crucially depends on the level
of trade costs and the cost of capital before subsidies. First, if trade costs are low relative
to the cost of capital, rms will always choose to serve both markets from a single pro-
duction site. In that case, the tax base is fully mobile and rms react in the usual way
to tax dierences by changing locations: tax rates and investment subsidies are strategic
complements and capital will always be subsidized in any non-cooperative tax equilib-
rium (e.g., Wilson, 1999; Hau
er and Wooton, 1999; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005).
Second, if trade costs are high relative to the investment cost, rms will always choose
2Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Hau
er and P
 uger (2004), and Borck and P
 uger (2006) develop
`new economic geography' models of capital tax competition with product dierentiation, trade costs,
and imperfect competition. Contrary to our contribution, they do not allow for multinationals, and their
CES framework abstracts from pro-competitive eects. Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) develop a
model similar to ours featuring pro-competitive eects. Yet, they do not allow for multinationals by
assuming that rms operate in a single country only. Most other contributions deal with multinationals
by focussing on the location and investment choices of a single monopolist (e.g., Hau
er and Wooton,
1999, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard, 2003; Ra 2004). The international trade literature dealing with
multinationals usually disregards issues of tax competition and the impacts this may have on rms'
choices (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
3to run multiple production plants and serve each market locally through subsidiary sales.
By making such investments, rms gain access to spatially separated markets and save on
trade and transport costs. In that case, multinationals are more protable than exporters
and governments may tax away the `organizational rents' without triggering relocation.
Consequently, when all rms engage in horizontal FDI, the tax bases becomes inelastic
and tax competition is absent. There would, for example, be no scope for tax competition
in a world where all rms are `McDonald-type' multinational corporations which nd it
protable to build and operate an outlet in each locale to sell their `hamburgers' there.3
The most interesting case occurs for intermediate values of trade costs where multi-
nationals and exporters coexist. Here, subsidies have an impact on rms' organization,
rather than rms' location, since they induce exporters to build additional plants in the
countries that oer large enough subsidies. In that case, higher subsidies reduce the cost
of capital and increase the number of horizontal multinationals operating in the global
economy. As a result, local investment subsidies have no impact on rms' production in
foreign countries, and governments' subsidies become strategically independent. Further-
more, we show that subsidies are lower in the presence of multinationals: when compared
to the case in which rms are constrained to operate a single plant only, as is usually
assumed in the tax competition literature, the presence of multinationals leads to lower
equilibrium subsidies.
Our analysis further reveals two important dierences between rms' location and
structure in the presence and in the absence of horizontal multinationals. First, in the
presence of multinationals, the location of production facilities depends on the absolute
level of taxes and subsidies across countries, whereas it depends on the dierence in taxes
or subsidies when all rms operate a single plant only. Second, the impact of taxes and
subsidies on industry prots crucially depends on the presence of multinationals. Whereas
higher subsidies raise industry prots when all rms exports from a single production fa-
cility, they reduce them as soon as some rms have chosen a horizontal multinational
structure by building additional plants in foreign countries. In other words, subsidies
have a pro-competitive eect in the presence of multinationals. This is because an in-
crease in the level of subsidies reduces investment costs and leads to the entry of new
multinationals, which set lower markups and lower prices than exporters because they
`jump' trade barriers. The local industry then becomes more competitive and the foreign
exporters nd it more dicult to penetrate the local market. As a consequence, the re-
maining exporters are also enticed to invest in additional plants, which increases further
the number of production sites and, therefore, product market competition. Stated dif-
3Note that this result is similar to the one obtained in models with asymmetric country sizes, in which
the larger country displays a `home market eect' and may usually tax away `agglomeration rents' (e.g.,
Hau
er and Wooton, 1999; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005).
4ferently, in the presence of multinationals, subsidies have a negative eect on industry
prots and, by the same token, have a stronger eect on local consumption surplus.4
While these pro-competitive eects are good news for consumers, they are bad news
for residents with large prot claims. Hence, it is important to note that subsidy or tax
equilibria crucially depend on the way prots are redistributed to residents. Suppose,
for instance, that prots mainly accrue to foreign shareholders, so that governments put
no weight on industry prots in their objective functions. Then we show that there
exists a set of parameter values that supports multiple equilibria, one of which has low
subsidies and exporters only, whereas the other has higher subsidies and a combination
of exporters and multinationals. The existence of an equilibrium with higher subsidies
and multinationals is simply explained by the fact that the fall in industry prots does
not aect governments and that subsidies have larger eects on consumer surplus in
the presence of multinationals. Governments may thus subsidize more. By contrast,
when prots are mainly redistributed to residents, governments care about prot levels
and therefore set lower subsidies to reduce the pro-competitive eects. The dierence
between subsidies in the presence and in the absence of multinationals is smaller, and
multiple equilibria need no longer occur.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
and derive the equilibrium for given tax rates and a given spatial structure. Section 3
then discusses the spatial allocation and rms' production structures, taking tax rates
still as given. In Section 4, we describe governments' tax choices when they play a non-
cooperative game, and we fully characterize the equilibria as a function of the before-tax
cost of capital. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our main results and presents some
comparative statics. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our framework builds on Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), who introduce capital tax
competition in the `new economic geography' model by Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy with two countries, labeled H and F. Variables associated with each
country will be subscripted accordingly. Each country is endowed with a mass of L=2
immobile consumers, which have identical quasi-linear preferences over a homogeneous
good and a continuum of varieties of a horizontally dierentiated good. The subutility
4This feature of multinational activity goes unnoticed in models focusing on the choices of a single
monopolist, as well as in models relying on CES preferences and constant mark-ups.
5over the varieties v 2 [0;1] of the dierentiated good is quadratic as in Ottaviano et al.
































where qji(v) denotes the consumption in country i of the dierentiated variety v produced
in country j; 
j stands for the set of varieties produced in country j, with measure Nj
(and with NH + NF = 1); qo
i stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good in
country i; and  > 0,  > 
 > 0 are parameters.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, which she supplies inelastically, qo
units of the homogeneous good (qo > 0), and one unit of the world capital stock. Fur-
thermore, we assume that each agent has identical claims to rms' prots, an assumption
that we relax later in Section 5. A consumer in country i = H;F maximizes her utility
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where pji(v) is the consumer price in country i of variety v produced in country j; wi is
the wage rate in country i; r is the rental rate of a unit of capital, and w stands for
world prots.
In what follows, we assume that all varieties produced in the same country are sym-
metric, which allows us to alleviate notation by dropping the variety index. Consumer
demands are then as follows:
qij = a   (b + c)pij + cPj













Pj  Njpjj + Nipij i 6= j
can be interpreted as the average price of dierentiated goods in country j.
2.2 Technology and trade costs
The homogeneous good is produced under perfect competition using one unit of labor only.
Prot maximization in this sector implies that po
i = wi. We assume that this good can be
6traded at no cost between countries and we choose it as the num eraire: po
H = po
F = 1. We
furthermore assume that labor is intersectorally mobile, so that wages in all industries
are given by wH = wF = 1.
Dierentiated goods are produced by rms operating under increasing returns to scale.
Each rm owns some rm-specic asset (e.g., a patent right) which grants it monopoly
power over a single variety. The total mass of rms is, therefore, equal to the total mass
of varieties, which is xed to 1. The total mass of rms being xed, rms make (strictly)
positive prots. This is either because entrepreneurs are scare, or because the number of
patents is limited, or because there exist signicant barriers to entry in the industry.
Firms make both a locational and an organizational choice as they choose both the
location and the number of plants they operate. Stated dierently, they can choose to
become either exporters (one plant) or multinationals (two plants). Denote by ni the mass
of exporters based in country i = H;F and by m the mass of multinationals, respectively.5
Since each exporter and multinational rm produces a single variety, we must have that
the number of varieties Ni is equal to ni + m in each country i = H;F. The total mass
of varieties being equal to 1, we thus have
NH + NF = nH + nF + m = 1:
All rms have access to the same technology and produce their variety by using both
labor and capital. Following Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), we assume that labor enters
only the variable cost, whereas the xed cost is incurred in terms of capital only. Without
loss of generality, we may set the marginal labor requirement to zero since this amounts
to rescaling rms' demand intercepts (see Ottaviano et al., 2002). Firms require f units
of capital to set up a plant in any country, and capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile
across countries and sectors. We assume that the rental rate r of capital is exogenously
xed. Constant rental rates may re
ect the constant degree of intertemporal substitution
of lenders, or simply the fact that the industry is small when compared to the rest of the
economy. Without loss of generality we normalize r to one.
When governments do not subsidize capital, the cost of a plant is equal to f. When
governments in H and F do subsidize capital at the rates H and F; the costs of a plant
are equal to f (1   H) and f (1   F), respectively. For the sake of exposition, we denote
the rms' after-subsidy xed costs by f  sH and f  sF, where sH  fH and sF  fF
stand for the values of subsidies. Hence, the subsidies sH and sF are lump sum transfers
to the rms, which depend on the number and location of their investments. Note that all
5We do not need to keep track of where multi-plant rms are headquartered. This is because we
assume that xed costs are the same in both countries. When xed costs dier, headquarters will be
exclusively located in the low xed cost country (Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p.54).
7rms in a country are equally subsidized.6 Subsidies to local exporters can be interpreted
as incentives for rms not to relocate their plants abroad. Thus, subsidies play the dual
role of trying to attract new rms and preventing existing rms from leaving. Note,
nally, that nothing precludes subsidies a priori from being negative, in which case they
are equivalent to source-based capital taxes payed in the location where the capital is
used.7
Turning to transportation, shipping each variety of the dierentiated good across
countries is costly, whereas shipping it within each country is free. More specically,
shipping one unit of any variety between the two countries entails a per-unit cost of  > 0
units of the num eraire. Note that the existence of transport costs and, since we focus
on capital taxation, the absence of transfer pricing problems, ensure that multinationals
behave like local rms in each domestic market and serve that market through local sales
only. Indeed, given plant-level scale economies and transport costs the rm will never
produce a fraction of demand locally while importing the rest from abroad. Hence, our
model is of the `proximity-vs-scale' type (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).8
Firms and governments play a three-stage game. In the rst stage, governments set
non-cooperatively their taxes (subsidies) to rms. In the second stage, rms choose the
number and location of their production plants. Finally, in the third stage, rms set prot
maximizing prices given the previous choices. We solve the game by backward induction
for its subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
In the following sub-section, we present the market outcome. We then discuss rms'
locational and organizational choices in Section 3, and the tax equilibria in Section 4.
2.3 Market outcome
Since our framework features a continuum of rms, each rm is negligible to the market
and sets its own prices taking all other variables as given. Considering nH, nF and m,
as well as the subsidies sH and sF, as xed, rms maximize their prots with respect to
6Such equal treatment of rms circumvents the problem of tax discrimination that arise when tax
incentives apply only to non-residents (UNCTAD, 2000). For example, \the EU adopted a Code of
Conduct for business taxation, in which member states committed themselves to refrain from `unfair' tax
policies" (Hau
er and Wooton, 2005, p.2).
7In this paper, we do not consider residence-based taxes. Under perfect information, residence-based
taxes are non-distortionary lump sum transfers which do not generate tax competition between govern-
ments. The main discussion about residence-based taxes arises under imperfect information when tax
authorities can hardly observe and collect the foreign capital incomes of their residents. This discussion
is beyond the scope of the present paper. Furthermore, Keen (1993) argues that the eective taxation of
multinationals is source based, independently of what tax codes eectively stipulate.
8When all rms are horizontal multinationals, there is no more trade in our model. This is a strong
result that may not hold when multinationals are also multiproduct rms (Baldwin and Ottaviano, 2001).
8prices. In accord with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Head and Mayer, 2000; Haskel and
Wolf, 2001), we assume that international markets are segmented, i.e., rms are free to
set prices specic to each national market they sell their product in.
In what follows, we superscript variables pertaining to exporters and to multinationals
by x and by m, respectively. The prot before subsidy of an exporter established in









(pij   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Since multinationals serve each market locally only, their local pricing decisions are iden-
tical to those of domestic rms operating in same market. Firms maximize their prots
with respect to own prices taking the average prices PH and PF as given. Substituting




















ji = (b + c)(p

ji   ); (2)
for i = H;F and j 6= i. Because nH + nF + m = 1, the equilibrium price in country H




2a + c   c(m + nH)
2(2b + c)
:
This reveals that prices in country H decrease with the mass of plants located in that
country (m +nH). Note that the mass of multinationals appears in both countries' equi-
librium prices. Hence, whereas exporters push prices down only in the country they locate
in, multinationals put downward pressure on prices in both countries, and the more so the
higher trade costs are. As we will show below, this property has important consequences
on the equilibrium outcome of the tax game.
To simplify the analysis and to avoid a proliferation of sub-cases, we assume that
trade costs are suciently low such that international trade is always feasible. It is
readily veried that q
HF > 0 and q
FH > 0 for all allocations (nH;nF;m) provided that






Under Condition (3), international trade occurs regardless of government's subsidies and
rms' location and organization.


































































We now turn to the analysis of rms' locational and organizational choices.
3 Firms' structure, location, and prots
Subsidies aect rms' location, production structure, and prots. We begin by investigat-
ing which types of equilibrium congurations (n
H;n
F;m) may arise for any given couple
of subsidies (sH;sF). We then discuss how subsidies aect rms' prots in the dierent
congurations.
3.1 Structure and location
Only two equilibrium congurations are relevant for the subsidy game between govern-
ments. For the sake of conciseness, we therefore only discuss these congurations in
detail.
(i) A pure exporter conguration includes only exporters (i.e., m = 0). In this case,
subsidy-inclusive prots of exporters must be equalized across countries. Evaluating (4)
and (5) at the equilibrium prices (1), the prot dierential between exporters in countries
H and F is equal to

x
H + sH   (
x





Equating this prot dierential to zero, the equilibrium masses of exporters and plants in

















(sH   sF): (7)
Hence, by making capital cheaper, a country's subsidy attracts exporters from the other
country. In a pure exporter conguration, subsidy competition is a zero-sum game in
terms of number of local rms and, therefore, in term of product access for consumers.
10Feasibility of a pure exporter conguration further requires that exporters are more




m + sj   
x
i  0; i = H;F () sH + sF  2B   K (8)
n

H  0 () sF  sH + K (9)
n

F  0 () sF  sH   K; (10)
where all prots are computed using the equilibrium prices (1), evaluated at nH = n
H,
nF = n
F and m = 0, and where
B  f  
(b + c)[4a   (2b + c)]
8(2b + c)
L:
The set of subsidies supporting this conguration, delimited by conditions (8){(10), is
depicted by zone (i) in Figure 1.9
Insert Figure 1 about here.
(ii) A mixed conguration occurs when exporters and multinationals coexist (i.e.,
m > 0, n
H  0 and n
F  0). Therefore, subsidy-inclusive prots of all types of rms
must be equalized across countries: x
H +sH = x
F + sF = m + sH +sF. Note that this
conguration includes the particular case where all rms are multinationals, but are just
indierent between building one or two plants.
The prot dierential between an exporter in country H and a multinational can be
expressed as follows:














  f + sF;
a symmetric expression holding for country F. Equating the above prot dierentials to











K   2B + sF
K

By reducing the net cost of capital, a country's subsidy increases the number of plants in













K   2B + sH + sF
K
: (11)
Before going further, it is important to observe the following two points. First, the
mass of exporters n
H in country H is independent of the subsidy sH set by this country,
9The parameter values underlying Figure 1 are as follows:  =  = 1, 
 = 0:5, L = 4,  = 0:1, and
f = 3=40.
11because it only induces exporters in country F to build a second plant in country H.
Second, an identical increase in subsidy has a stronger impact on the mass of local plants
and varieties in the mixed conguration than in the pure exporter conguration. Indeed,
comparing (11) and (7), respectively, one can check that @(n
H+m)=@sH = 1=K is larger
than @n
H=@sH = 1=(2K). The intuition is that, by `going multinational', rms make
the global economy more competitive, thereby cutting prots of single-plant exporters
by making their access to foreign markets more dicult. This in turn entices even more
exporters to `go multinational', thereby further increasing competition. As a result, the
eect of a subsidy on the number of local plant is stronger in the mixed conguration.
Finally, feasibility of the conguration requires that
n

H  0 () sF  B (12)
n

F  0 () sH  B (13)
m
 > 0 () sH + sF > 2B   K: (14)
Condition (14) is simply the counterpart of condition (8). The set of subsidies supporting
this conguration, delimited by conditions (12){(14), is depicted by zone (ii) in Figure 1.
We summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (rms' location) In a pure exporter conguration where each rm ex-
ports from a single plant, only the subsidy dierential has an eect on the location of
production. In a mixed conguration where exporters coexist with multinationals, subsi-
dies have an eect on both organization and location structures of rms. A higher level
of subsidy in a country entices some exporters to build up of a second plant there and has
no impact on the production in other country.
As shown in Figure 1 and in Appendix 1, other congurations exist. For instance, when
subsidies are very large, there exists a conguration (iii) that includes only multinationals.
When the subsidy sH is suciently larger (resp smaller) than the subsidy sF, there exist
congurations (iv) and (v) (resp., (iv') and (v')) which include no exporters in country F
(resp., in country H). Yet, as shown in Section 4, such congurations are never equilibria
of the subsidy game between governments, so that we may disregard them.
3.2 Prots
Because subsidies aect rms' structure and location, their impact on subsidy-inclusive
prots is a priori ambiguous. A more careful analysis of this point will prove useful in
guiding intuition on the impact of multinationals on subsidy equilibria.
In the pure exporter conguration (i), a subsidy increase in a country directly raises the
prot of rms located in that country. Moreover, since the subsidy increase entices rms
12to leave the other country, and thus weakens competition there, it also raises the prots
of rms in the other country. Indeed, in (the interior of the domain of) conguration (i),

















Yet, this result does not hold in the presence of multinationals, since subsidies aect the
number of plants rather than rms' location. In fact, a subsidy increases competition in
the country where new plants are built, whereas it leaves competition in the other country
unchanged. Thus, competition in the global economy increases and prots fall in both
























HH > =2 and p
FF > =2 under the trade feasibility condition (3). Hence, the
impact of subsidies on prots is drastically modied in the presence of multinationals,
due to the possibility of rms' endogenously changing their production structure.
Proposition 2 (rms' prots) Suppose that governments increase their subsidies (re-
duce their taxes). Then, prots after subsidy increases in a pure exporter conguration
(i) whereas they fall in a mixed conguration (ii).
It is easy to show that prots are minimized in two cases. Firstly, when rms are
heavily taxed (i.e., (sH;sF) ! ( 1; 1) in a pure exporter conguration, which yields
negative prots below some threshold); and secondly, when rms are highly subsidized
in the mixed congurations (i.e., (sH;sF) = (B;B), which yields a local minimum for
prots). In what follows, we restrict our attention to the meaningful situation in which
rms' subsidy-inclusive prots are positive so that production takes place. This imposes,
rstly, that taxes are not too high so that rms make positive prots in conguration (i);
and, secondly, that prots are positive at the point (sH;sF) = (B;B), which implies that
rms' prots are always positive for any optimal subsidies in conguration (ii). Because









which is always satised since  < trade.
To sum up, our analysis reveals that subsidies have a strong impact on rms' location,
structure, and prots. In particular, when subsidies are small relative to xed costs, the
industry consists of exporters only, whereas it also includes multinationals when they are
larger. In the absence of multinational rms, the location of production is quite sensitive
13to the dierence in subsidies. By contrast, in the presence of multinational rms, the
dierence in subsidies plays no role in the sense that a government does not loose local
production when the other country increases its subsidy. Finally, rms may gain or loose
from higher subsidies, depending on their organizational structure. In particular, prots
may well decrease with larger subsidies as the global economy becomes more competitive
due to an increasing mass of multinationals. We now explore the impact of the existence
of horizontal multinationals on governments' subsidy competition.
4 Subsidy competition
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) have shown that competing governments subsidize
capital to attract mobile single-plant rms. What happens when rms can choose both
the location and the number of plants? How does the existence of multinationals aect
the traditional insights gained from tax competition models?
In this section, we assume that rms and capital are wholly owned by residents of
countries H and F (`fully diversied portfolio' assumption). More precisely, country H's
residents get one-half of rms' prots after subsidy, and country F's residents get the
























which consists of local consumer surplus minus the direct cost of subsidizing capital, plus
one-half of rms' prots, x
i +si and m+sH+sF, plus a constant endowment and capital
income term.11 Note that the local consumer surplus SH is a function of (pHH;nH;nF;m)
and that prots x
i and m are functions of (pHH;pFF).
Dierentiating WH with respect to sH, we can express the impact of a marginal increase
10Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) use a similar assumption. Still, it is known that the ownership
structure of rms and the distribution of prots is not innocuous (e.g., Ra, 2004). In Section 5, we
discuss the robustness of our results under alternative assumptions on the distribution of prots.
11In this model, capital lenders earn a xed income (r = 1) that does not depend on the spatial
distribution and the organization of rms. Therefore, local welfare WH does not explicitly depend on
xed costs f, although it implicitly depends on them through the equilibrium location of rms.























































































(nH + m): (16)
In this expression, the last term captures the direct cost of a subsidy paid to all rms. The
rst three terms represent the indirect eects of the subsidy through relocation of rms
at constant prices; whereas the intermediate terms nally capture the indirect eects of
a subsidy through price changes.
4.1 Goverments' best responses
We now determine the subsidies government H may potentially choose in the subsidy
game for a given value of sF. This allows us then to derive and discuss governments'
best responses associated with dierent spatial structures. All standard calculations are
relegated to Appendix 2.
To begin with, observe that government H will always choose subsidies that yield either
conguration (i) or (ii). This observation justies our focus on these two congurations
in previous sections. Assume, indeed, that the subsidy sH were suciently large so
that country F would include no exporters, which corresponds to either conguration
(iii), (iv) or (v) in Figure 1. Then every rm would operate a plant in country H and
possibly one in country F. If government H increased its subsidy, this would not alter
the distribution of exporters across the two countries. Furthermore, because the subsidy
sH has no impact on the decision to build a plant in country F, this action would not
alter rms' organizational structure. Hence, the only eect of such a subsidy would be
to raise rms' prots, which cannot be welfare improving since some prots accrue to
foreign shareholders.12 Formally, one can check in congurations (iii), (iv) and (v) that
@n
H=@sH = @n













By consequence, government H will never set a subsidy compatible with congurations
(iii), (iv) and (v); whereas, by symmetry, government F will never set a subsidy compatible
12As shown in Section 5, this result holds for all possible ways of distributing prots between domestic
and foreign shareholders and, therefore, does not depend on our assumption of an equal redistribution.
15with congurations (iii), (iv') and (v'). Tax competition equilibria therefore necessarily
occur in congurations (i) and (ii) (including their borders), which we now analyze in
more detail.
We start by determining government H's best response functions for subsidies sup-
porting congurations (i) and (ii) separately. We then combine the pieces of these two
best response functions and derive the equilibria of the subsidy game.
Pure exporter congurations (i): Suppose that the industry consists of only ex-
porters, as in conguration (i) above. Straightforward calculation shows that changes in
















































































The rst term in (18) stands for the cost of the subsidy paid to all rms located in
country H. Indeed, when government H increases its subsidy sH it pays an additional
amount to all rms established in H, with one-half of this subsidy being recouped by
local shareholders through prot redistribution. The second term captures the cost of the
subsidy due to rms relocating to country H. Since prots across countries are equal in
equilibrium, shareholders are unaected by such a relocation and the cost of the subsidy
is simply equal to sH. The third term captures the impact of rms' relocation on local
consumer surplus. An increase in the subsidy sH attracts plants to country H, so that
more varieties are produced and sold locally at the price pHH which allows consumers to
save on transport costs. The fourth term is identically equal to zero. This is because
when prots are evenly redistributed across countries in the model by Ottaviano et al.
(2002), an increase in pHH reduces the consumer surplus of home residents and augments
their share in total prots in exactly the same proportions. The last term nally captures
the eect of a change in foreign prices due to the subsidy. An increase in sH entices
rms to leave country F, which increases prices and prots there and thus benets to
local shareholders. To sum up, the government balances the costs of the subsidy and its
associated prot eects with the benets in local consumer surplus and foreign prots.
In Appendix 2, we show that dWH=dsH is a decreasing function of sH and that
16dWH=dsH = 0 if and only if





4a(b + c)    (2b2 + 4bc + c2)
2(2b + c)(16b + 7c)
;
which is an ane function of sF, with positive intercept and a positive slope less than 1.
When government F increases it subsidy sF, government H responds by raising its subsidy
sH but by less than the full amount. Hence, in a pure exporter conguration, subsidies
are strategic complements, which is the standard result of the literature. Note that b sH
shifts upwards when the demand for the dierentiated good (i.e., a or L) increases. This
is because in such a case there is a larger volume of imports so that government H has
more incentives to attract rms in order to save transport costs incurred by its residents.
The graph of the best response b sH(sF) is depicted in Figure 2, panels (a) and (b).13
Note that when the graph of b sH(sF) lies above the domain of conguration (i), the best
response is given by the upper border (9) of the conguration. Indeed, in such a case,
government H has an incentive to raise its subsidy when the latter lies in conguration (i)
and, by (17), it has an incentive to reduce its subsidy when the latter lies in conguration
(v). The optimal subsidy lies on the upper border (9) of conguration (i). Similarly, when
the graph of b sH(sF) lies below the domain of conguration (i), the best response is given
by the lower border (10) of the conguration.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Mixed congurations (ii): Suppose that the industry comprises all types of rms as is
















Hence, an increase in country H's subsidy has as sole eect to entice exporters in country
F to become multinationals. Stated dierently, the subsidy does not alter the number
of plants and, therefore, the competition in country F. Still, in contrast to Ottaviano
and van Ypersele (2005), the subsidy aects the number of varieties produced locally in
13Figure 2 is drawn for the following parameter values:  =  = 1, 
 = 1=2, L = 7; = 1=2, and
f = 1:2. Panel (a) depicts government H's best response of Section 4 (full and equal redistribution of
prots to local shareholders, H = F = 1=2); whereas panel (b) depicts government H's best response
of Section 5:2 (full redistribution of prots to absentee shareholder, H = F = 0).
17the subsidizing country, since it attracts plants. In other words, tax competition is not a
`zero-sum game' in terms of locally produced varieties.14














































As in a pure exporter conguration, the rst term of (20) stands for the cost of the
subsidy paid to all rms located in country H, when one-half of the subsidy is recouped
by local shareholders. The second term captures again the cost of the subsidy paid to the
exporters that open a second plant in country H. The third term captures the impact
of rms' relocation on local consumer surplus. As new plants are built in country H,
competition increases, prices drop, and consumer surplus rises in that country. Finally,
the fourth term is identically equal to zero, as in the pure exporter conguration, and for
the same reasons.
In Appendix 2, we show that dWH=dsH is a decreasing function of sH and that
dWH=dsH = 0 in a mixed conguration if and only if









(4a   2b + c): (21)
Therefore, the subsidy that maximizes local welfare in country H is independent of the
other country's subsidy sF. In the presence of multinationals, each government disregards
the action of its rival when it sets its own subsidy and tax competition may entirely
disappear.
The graph of the best response e s is also depicted in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.
Note that, as is the case of b sH discussed before, when the graph of e s lies above (resp.,
below) the domain of conguration (ii), the best response is given by the upper border
(13) (resp., lower border (14)) supporting this conguration.
Switch between congurations (i) and (ii): For some sets of parameter values, the
best response functions may have an upward jump between congurations (i) and (ii)
while they may have a continuous transition between these two congurations for other
sets of parameter values. In the latter case, the best response function is downward
sloping, thus implying that subsidies are strategic substitutes over some range. This is
shown in panel (a) of Figure 2. The existence of strategic substitutes crucially hinges on
14This eect seems to be supported empirically. Indeed, Devereux and Freeman (1995) have reported
that tax policy hardly aects the investor's choice between domestic and foreign investment. Even when
tax policy aects this choice, it often does not take the form of a simple relocation but consists in the
opening of an additional production unit.
18governments' trade-o between local consumer surplus and the share of producer surplus
accruing to local residents. When subsidies are strategic substitutes, a rise in country
F's subsidy raises the number of plants there, without altering the number of plants in
country H. Hence, whereas residents in country H have access to the same number of
varieties at the same price (and, therefore, enjoy the same consumer surplus), they earn
less because total prots decrease with larger subsidies in the presence of multinationals
(see Proposition 2). Government H's best response is then to cut its own subsidy in
response to the other country's subsidy increase. By so doing, it benets from two eects:
rst, it saves on costly subsidies, and second it increases prots that accrue to its residents.
At the margin, these two eects outweigh the negative impact that the subsidy has on the
number of plants and varieties produced in country H. Note, nally, that subsidies are
more likely to become strategic substitutes over some range when residents are entitled
to larger shares of total prots. This point will be further developed in Section 5.
Let us summarize the foregoing results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (subsidy competition) Whereas subsidies are strategic complements
in pure exporter congurations, they are strategically independent in mixed congurations
where multinationals and exporters coexist. On the border between the two congurations,
subsidies may be strategic substitutes.
In the previous paragraphs, we have described the pieces of the best response functions
for conguration (i), (ii), and the border between them. Yet, each government may
set subsidies that induce dierent congurations, so that its best response to the other
country's subsidy may imply changes of rms' production structures. Put dierently,
governments' best response functions will consist of the combination of the pieces derived
above and will include transitions between congurations, which may be continuous or
discontinuous, depending on parameter values.
4.2 Subsidy equilibria
We now characterize the equilibrium congurations when governments simultaneously
and non-cooperatively set their subsidies. Note from the outset that the existence of
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this subsidy game is guaranteed, because subsidies are
dened over a compact subset of R and because governments' subsidy reaction functions
have no downward jump (see Vives, 1999, p.41). We rst present the possible equilibrium
congurations and then discuss the conditions under which they occur. As suggested by
the analysis of the best response functions, subsidy equilibria may yield a conguration
with only exporters, a mixed conguration including both organizational strutures, or a
conguration with only multinationals. We start by describing the former.
19(i) A pure exporter equilibrium exhibits the traditional features of tax competition.
When the tax base is internationally mobile, subsidies are strategic complements since
each government raises its subsidy in reaction to an increase in the other country's subsidy,
to counteract the relocation of mobile rms. Such `subsidy competition' may lead to
an excessive in
ation of subsidies or, equivalently, excessively low taxes. Formally, the
equilibrium subsidies are such that s
H = b sH(s
F) and s






F = L(b + c)
4a(b + c)   (2b2 + 4bc + c2)
8(2b + c)
2 > 0: (22)
First, as can be seen from expression (22), equilibrium subsidies increase with demand
(a and L). When demand is large, both governments have incentives to attract rms
so that local consumers save on transport costs. Second, the equilibrium subsidies are
always positive. Indeed, as usual in the tax competition literature, governments impose a
negative externality on each other and oer too large subsidies or set too low tax rates.15
Finally, subsidies are independent of rms' xed costs f. In a pure exporter conguration,
rms have to pay the xed capital cost wherever they locate, so that governments may
neglect this aspect when deciding on their optimal subsidies.





F = e s; (23)
where e s is given by (21). This illustrates the impact on tax competition of rms being able
to endogenously choose their production structure. When exporters and multinationals
co-exist, governments' subsidy choices are independent. Contrary to the pure exporter
case, the equilibrium subsidies now decrease with larger demand (i.e., a and L), whereas
they increase with respect to the cost of a plant. The latter eect is due to the fact that
rms may now choose not to pay the cost of the second plant when it is too high; whereas
the former eect stems from the fact that increasing demands raise operating prots
of multinationals (and therefore, in equilibrium, of all rms), which allows governments
to subsidize less (resp., to tax more) without triggering a structural change in rms'
organization.
As a limit case of the mixed equilibrium (ii), the subsidy game may yield a pure multi-
national equilibrium. This corresponds to the case where the graph of e s lies above
the domain of conguration (ii), and where the best response function thus lies on the
border between congurations (ii) and (iv) where only multinationals survive. This case
naturally occurs for small xed costs f of a plant. On the one hand, when the economy
consists of multinationals only, as in conguration (iii), these rms constitute an immobile
15See Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) for a welfare analysis of the pure exporter conguration.
20tax base which governments tend to tax as much as possible without triggering organi-
zational changes. Hence, the subsidy equilibrium lies at the point at which any further
decrease in subsidies entices some multinationals to modify their structure. On the other
hand, a lower subsidy leading to conguration (ii) cannot improve local welfare as its costs
for local consumers are higher than its benets. Therefore, subsidy competition yields an
equilibrium where all rms own two plants but are almost willing to shut one down. In





F = B = f  
(b + c)[4a   (2b + c)]
8(2b + c)
L: (24)
Subsidies are thus decreasing in demands (i.e., a and L) and in transport costs (i.e., ),
for the same reasons as in the mixed congurations (ii). Note, nally, that the equilibrium
subsidies increase one-to-one with respect to f. This is because any increase in f decreases
multinationals' prots by exactly that amount, which must be oset by an increase in
subsidies for rms to remain multinational in equilibrium.
Finally, the subsidy game may yield a continuum of pure exporter equilibria that
lie on the downward sloping part of the best response function. The associated equilib-
rium subsidies are such that all rms choose to export but are almost willing to become















and are decreasing in the volume of demand and in transport costs. It is noteworthy that,
in this conguration, we have asymmetric equilibria in an otherwise perfectly symmetric
set up. Governments may choose not to set the same subsidies, and there is a continuum
of ways of doing so. In such an equilibrium, each government raises its subsidy up to
the level that triggers the entry of multinationals. Indeed, below this level, each govern-
ment competes with the other to attract exporters and to allow its consumers to save on
transport costs. Above this level, the additional competition induced by multinationals
deteriorates prots so much that the increase in subsidy reduces local prot earnings more
than it increases consumer surplus.
We now establish the precise conditions under which the above equilibria occur. In
Appendix 3, we dene three thresholds 0 < f1 < f2 < f3. Using those thresholds, we
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (subsidy equilibria) The equilibrium of the subsidy game yields
 a pure multinational conguration if and only if f  f1;
21 a mixed conguration with multinationals and exporters if and only if f 2 (f1;f2);
 a continuum of pure exporter congurations if and only if f 2 [f2;f3);
 a pure exporter conguration if and only if f  f3.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
As expected, pure multinational equilibria of the tax game occur when the xed cost f
of a plant is small, when product demand (a or L) and transport cost  are large; whereas
pure exporter equilibria occur in the opposite conguration. When these conditions are
not met, the equilibrium includes at least some exporters and some multnationals.
We conclude this section by a remark on the level of subsidies. In conguration
(i) with only exporters, subsidies are always positive and independent of xed capital
costs. However, in conguration (ii) including multinationals, subsidies may be positive
or negative depending on the cost of a plant. Capital may be taxed in the equilibrium of
the subsidy game when xed costs are small or when product demand is large. Stated
dierently, multinational rms represent an immobile tax base which governments may
protably tax, provided being multinational is protable enough. We can further show
the following result:
Proposition 5 (lower subsidies) Whenever a subsidy equilibrium with multinationals
exists, the subsidies are lower than in the hypothetical case without multinationals.
Proof. It is readily veried that s   e s > 0 if and only if
f < f 
(b + c)L[4a(6b + 5c)   (12b2 + 16bc + 3c2)]
16(2b + c)2 : (26)
As shown in Appendix 3, a subsidy equilibrium with multinationals exists if and only if
f < f2. One can check that f   f2 > 0 for all admissible parameter values of the model.
Hence, condition (26) holds, which proves our claim.
Proposition 5 states that, when compared to a world in which multinationals are
prohibited, the presence of multinationals relaxes the problem of tax competition, thereby
alleviating the `race to the bottom'.
5 Discussion
We now discuss the impact of market integration and trade barriers on subsidy compe-
tition, and we analyze the robustness of our ndings with respect to our assumption on
the distribution of prots.
225.1 Market integration and trade barriers
In many regions of the world, countries have engaged in a process of market integration
under which they have reduced trade barriers and trade costs. While market integration
allows consumers to purchase more varieties at lower prices, it also reshapes the spatial
structure of industries and alters governments' incentives to attract rms (see Krugman,
1991). In this section, we show that a fall in trade barriers makes a pure exporter cong-
uration more likely and has ambiguous eects on subsidy competition.
First, a fall in trade barriers makes a pure exporter conguration more likely. Indeed,
from Figure 1, one can observe that the set of subsidies supporting the pure exporter con-
guration (i) gets larger for small trade barriers , whereas the set of subsidies supporting
the mixed conguration (ii) shrinks. Indeed, smaller trade barriers shift the border (8)
outwards and the borders (9) and (10) inwards. In particular, when  is close to 0, the
borders (9) and (10) collapse on the 45 line so that the mixed conguration (ii) van-
ishes. One can show that the equilibrium involves only exporters and that subsidy are nil
(s
H = s
F = 0). Indeed, consumers have the same access to all varieties and rms have the
same access to all consumers independently of their production place. So, rms have no
incentives to set up a second plant and governments have no incentives to oer subsidies
to attract production to their countries.
Second, a fall in trade barriers has ambiguous eects on equilibrium subsidies in the




 0 ()    
2a(b + c)
2b2 + 4bc + c2;
where  < trade. Hence, when trade barriers lie in the interval (0;), equilibrium subsidies
fall with any decrease in trade barriers. This is because the gain of having local rms falls
with smaller trade costs, which reduces governments' incentives to oer subsidies to attract
them. By contrast, for trade barriers lying in the interval (;trade), equilibrium subsidies
fall with any rise in trade barriers. In this case, import prices are high and import demands
are small. Therefore, equilibrium subsidies will be largest for intermediate values of trade
barriers since the gain from having local production is largest there.
Finally, a fall in trade barriers raises equilibrium subsidies in the mixed conguration.




L(b + c)(2a   2b + c)
16(2b + c)
< 0
where the last inequality holds because of the trade feasibility condition (3). Lower
trade barriers decrease the returns to being multinational and entice more rms to export
their goods from a single plant. As more rms become exporters, the tax base becomes
23more mobile and governments have stronger incentives to subsidize capital. Subsidy
competition therefore gets stronger as trade barriers fall.
Proposition 6 (trade barriers) In a pure exporter equilibrium, a fall in trade barriers
reduces equilibrium subsidies when trade barriers are suciently low, whereas it increases
them when trade barriers are suciently large. In a mixed conguration, a fall in trade
barriers always increases subsidies.
5.2 Prot distributions
Until now, we have assumed that all prots were equally redistributed to the residents
of the two countries. In this section, we relax this assumption to check the robustness
of our main results. We rstly show that, although the qualitative properties of the
best response functions remain unchanged, the structure of some equilibria strongly dier
when prots partly 
ow to absentee shareholders. Furthermore, we show that regional
asymmetries in rms' ownership are re
ected in asymmetries in governments' subsidies
and in the distribution of economic activity.
We rstly derive the optimal subsidies when a share 0  H < 1 of prots accrue to
country H's residents, whereas a share 0  F < 1 goes to country F's residents. The
total share of prots accruing to countries H and F is equal to H + F  1, with a
share 1   H   F of prot going to absentee shareholders. Without loss of generality,
we consider that country-H residents have a larger claim on prots: H  F. Redene
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m + sH + sF)]   (nH + m)sH:
Computations analoguous to those in the previous section show that the best response in
the support of pure exporter congurations (i) is given by
b sH(sF) =
8b + c(5   4H)
16b + c(9   4H)
sF
+
L(b + c) (2a(b + c)   (b2 + c(3   2H)b + c2(1   H)))
(2b + c)(16b + c(9   4H))
;
which has still a positive slope less than unity and a positive intercept. A symmetric
expression holds for country F. The equilibrium of the subsidy competition game can
then be readily computed and depends quite naturally on the shares of prot claims
H and F. Of course, equilibrium subsidies are no longer symmetric because of the
asymmetric prot claims.
24In the case of a mixed conguration (ii), the equilibrium subsidy is given by
e sH =
4b + c(3   2H)
8b + c(5   2H)
f   L(b + c)
2a   (b + c(H   1))
4(8b + c(5   2H))
;
which is again independent of sF. This shows that the strategic independence of subsidies
in the mixed conguration is not an artifact of our equal prot redistribution assumption.
Absentee shareholders: We now show that the structure of multiple equilibria varies
with the structure of prot claims. To x this idea assume, for simplicity, that all prots
go to absentee shareholders: H = F = 0. We can readily derive the new expressions
of the same thresholds f1;f2 and f3 as in Proposition 4 and compute the equilibria of
the subsidy game. However, the new thresholds now satisfy the conditions f1 < f3 < f2,
which yields the following subsidy equilibria:
Proposition 7 (subsidy equilibria with absentee shareholders) Suppose that prof-
its fully accrue to absentee shareholders (H = F = 0). Then the equilibrium of the
subsidy game yields
 a pure multinational conguration if and only if f  f1;
 a mixed conguration with multinationals and exporters if and only if f 2 (f1;f3);
 either a mixed conguration or a pure exporter conguration if and only if f 2
[f3;f2);
 a pure exporter conguration if and only if f  f2.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Proposition 6 illustrates the interesting situation in which there exist multiple equilibria
in the subsidy game, which are associated with dierent organizational structures of rms.
As already pointed out in Section 3, the best response functions are likely to display an
upward jump between congurations (i) and (ii) when governments put no weight on
prots. As can be seen from panel (b) of Figure 2, governments' best response functions
have an upward jump when the equilibrium switches from conguration (i) to (ii), which
yields multiple equilibria for f 2 [f3;f2).
The existence of an upward jump in the best response function for f 2 [f3;f2) is re-
lated to our observation in Section 3.1: the impact of a subsidy increase in terms of local
production is stronger in mixed congurations (ii) than in pure exporter congurations (i).
Thus, when governments do not value prots, they set higher subsidies in the presence of
multinationals simply because subsidies generate more consumer surplus by driving prices
down. This results in two possible equilibria: one equilibrium with high subsidies if the
25industry includes both exporters and multinationals, and another equilibrium with small
subsidies if the industry includes only exporters. Furthermore, this situation reverses the
conclusion of Proposition 5, which was established under the assumption that residents
have equal and full prot claims. Here, whenever a subsidy equilibrium with multination-
als exists, the subsidies are not lower than in the possible case without multinationals.
Instead, multinationals lead to higher equilibrium subsidies. Nevertheless, one can check
that welfare may still a priori be higher in both countries in the high subsidy equilibrium,
since prices are lower (competition) and there are transport cost savings.
Ownership asymmetries: We now study the impact of countries' shares in total prots
on the equilibrium subsidies. One can compute the equilibrium subsidies s
H and verify
that @s
H=@H > 0, whereas @e sH=@H < 0, symmetric conditions holding for country F.
Proposition 8 (prot shares) (i) An increase in country i's prot share i raises equi-
librium subsidies in the pure exporter congurations, whereas it reduces them in the mixed
congurations. (ii) The subsidy gap s
H   s
F in pure exporter congurations falls with
smaller trade costs, whereas the subsidy gap e sH   e sF in mixed congurations widens with
smaller trade costs if  < 2a=(10b + 3c) < trade, and falls otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
A direct consequence of the rst part of Proposition 8 is that the country with the
larger prot share subsidizes more (or taxes less) in the pure exporter equilibrium, whereas
it subsidizes less (or taxes more) in a mixed equilibrium.
When all rms are exporters, subsidies are used to attract rms and increase rms'
prots after subsidy. Because the country with larger prot claims recoups a larger share
of subsidies, that country is naturally enticed to set higher subsidies. Things are dierent
in the mixed conguration. Indeed, as argued in Section 4 and shown in Proposition
2, prots decrease with the level of subsidies in the mixed congurations. Hence, the
country having the higher prot claims will reduce its subsidy, since doing so will increase
its residents' wealth.
The second part of Proposition 8 states that regional asymmetries in subsidy (or tax)
policies vanish as trade costs fall in pure exporter congurations whereas those asym-
metries may amplify in the presence of multinationals. As explained in the previous
paragraph, in pure exporter congurations, a subsidy is less costly for the country having
higher prot claims because residents recoup a larger part of it through prot claims. In
mixed congurations, the country with higher prot claims subsidizes less in order to save
on subsidy expenses and to boost prots, which largely go to its domestic shareholders.
Finally, note that in the pure exporter case, international integration reduces the tax
gap between countries. This is because, contrary to Baldwin and Krugman (2004), there
26are no agglomeration economies that can be taxed away in our model and because rms
are not fully agglomerated in one country. Yet, in the presence of multinationals, the
subsidy gap widens for suciently small values of trade costs . In this case, subsidies in
both countries fall, yet they fall faster in the country having lower prot claims.
To conclude this section, we note that the shape of governments' best responses does
not depend on how prots are shared within the two countries and between the two
countries and the rest of the world. Of course, the equilibria become asymmetric and
take dierent values when prot ownership is not symmetric, yet the general nature of
the regimes remains the same. This suggests that the ndings of Section 4 are robust.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a model of subsidy competition when rms may en-
dogenously choose to become horizontal multinationals. We have shown that the impact
of subsidies on prices and prots signicantly dier when rms are able to choose their
location and organizational structure. In particular, when the cost of a second plant is
large relative to the costs of exporting goods, rms prefer to export their goods from a
single location only. Hence, when a country raises its subsidy, rms relocate their plant to
that country so that competition is strenghtened there and is relaxed in the other country.
Yet, the impact of the subsidy and the associated regional shift in competition translates
into higher subsidy-inclusive prots for the industry. On the contrary, when the cost of a
second plant is small relative to the costs of exporting goods, some rms prefer to operate
a plant in every country. In that case, when the subsidy in a country rises, some exporters
choose to open a second plant in this country so that competition is exacerbated there,
without getting relaxed in the other country. Competition increases globally so that prices
fall. In contrast to the case with exporting rms, this maps into a fall in subsidy-inclusive
prots. Thus, subsidies may trigger a rise or a fall in subsidy-inclusive prots, depending
on rms' changes in operational structure in response to the subsidy.
Governments' equilibrium subsidies are aected by rms' locational and organizational
choices. In the absence of horizontal multinational rms, rms locate according to subsidy
dierences and competition for mobile capital entices governments to in
ate subsidies.
This is the traditional result of the tax competition literature. However, the government
may not be responsive to the subsidy of the other governments in the presence of horizontal
multinational rms. Indeed, as higher subsidies reduce the cost of capital, rms are enticed
to set up additional plants. In this case, an increase or a decrease in a country's subsidy
induces some rms to open or to shut down a plant in that country only, and this decision
does not aect the production and price structure in the other country. The subsidy only
27has a local impact and induces no response from the other country. Subsidy competition
(or tax competition) for mobile capital is therefore less erce. This nding may shed some
light on why the prediction of the `race to the bottom' lacks empirical support, despite
the increasing presence of multinationals in the world economy.
We also discussed the case of trade integration and the role of rms' ownership on
subsidies and equilibrium structures. We have shown that a fall in trade barriers has
no unambiguous eect on subsidies in equilibria where all rms choose to export from a
single location only. By contrast a fall in trade barriers raises subsidies when countries
host multinational rms. Finally, when prots leak out of the countries where rms
locate, we have shown that there may exist multiple equilibria: the rst equilibrium
involves only exporting rms at low subsidies, whereas the second involves a combination
of exporters and horizontal multinationals at high subsidies. Although the welfare eect
is ambiguous, it is actually possible that the high subsidy equilibrium dominates the low
subsidy equilibrium, since it leads to lower prices and transport cost savings. Stated
dierently, the welfare impacts of the `race to the bottom' may be less clear-cut in the
endogenous presence of multinationals. This aspect is left for future research.
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30Appendix 1: Firms' structure and location
In addition to congurations (i) and (ii) discussed in Section 3, the following congurations
may arise (but are irrelevant for the subsequent subsidy game):
(iii) Pure multinational congurations (i.e., m = 1 and n
H = n
F = 0) are supported
for subsidies such that m + sH + sF > x
H + sH and m + sH + sF > x
F + sF, i.e.,
for sF > B and sH > B. Under these conditions, no rm has an incentive to shut
down a plant given the current level of subsidies. The set of subsidies supporting this
conguration is depicted by area (iii) in Figure 1.
(iv) Mixed congurations with agglomeration in H (i.e., n
F = 0, n
H > 0, and
m > 0) require that subsidy-inclusive prots of exporters in H and multinationals are
equalized: x







 = 1   n

H:
Feasibility of this conguration further requires that n
H > 0, m  0 and x
H + sH >
x
F+sF, which implies that B K  sF  B and sH > B. The set of subsidies supporting
this conguration is depicted by area (iv) in Figure 1.
(v) Full agglomeration in H (i.e., n
H = 1;n
F = m = 0) is feasible when x
H + sH >
x
F + sF and x
H > m + sF, which implies that sF < sH   K and sF < B + K. The set
of subsidies supporting this conguration is depicted by area (v) in Figure 1.
Note, nally, that there exist by symmetry two additional congurations (iv0) and (v0)
that are the mirror cases of (iv) and (v), namely mixed congurations with exporters in
F only, and full agglomeration in F.
Appendix 2: Best responses
In this appendix, we derive the optimal subsidies for congurations (i) and (ii). First, we












( + 2pHH)[ 2(b + c)pHHb + 4pHHc(nF + nH)
 c   b + 4a + 2cnF];
which we will use in both cases.
31Best responses in the support of conguration (i): In the pure exporter case, some
































Using these intermediate results, as well as the equilibrium prices (1) and the equilibrium
























































nHL(b + c)(2pFF   )
4
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Substituting these expressions into the marginal welfare (18), it is readily veried that
dWH=dsH  0 if and only if
 2(2b + c)(16b + 7c)sH + 2(8b + 3c)(2b + c)sF
+L(b + c)
 
4a(b + c)   
 
2b
2 + 4bc + c
2
 0;
which shows that local welfare WH is concave in sH and that the optimal subsidy is given
by b sH(sF).





















nF (2pHH   ); m
@m
@pHH
= mL(b + c)pHH:






















































L (a   bpHH)
2
 
L2 (b + c   2nFc)
8
=  sH + f







L(b + c) (4a   2b + c)   16f (2b + c)
4L(b + c)2c
;
which shows again that local welfare is concave in sH and that the optimal subsidy is
given by (21).
Appendix 3: Subsidy equilibria





F) be the intersection points of the line sH = 2B   K   sF with
the best response functions sH = e s and sH = b sH(sF), respectively. One can check that
those points are given by
s
1


















L(b + c) (18a   9b   c)
4(12b + 5c)
:
One can further check that
s
1
F > B   K () f > f1 





F > B  
K
2
() f > f2 





F > B  
K
2
() f > f3 
L(b + c) [4a(3b + 2c)   (6b2 + 6cb + c2)]
8(2b + c)2 :
Under condition (3), we get 0 < f1 < f2 < f3.
We now study the best response functions for four ranges of the xed cost f. The





F) and to visualize the equilibria.16
Insert Figure 3 about here.
First, when f  f1, we get s1
F  B   K=2, so that the sole equilibrium lies on the
border between conguration (ii) and (iii) and implies only multinationals. We also get
16The parameter values underlying Figure 3 are the same than the ones in Figure 2, except for the
xed cost f.
33s2
F < B K=2 which implies that there exists no pure exporter equilibrium in the support
of conguration (i). The unique equilibrium thus involves only multinationals.
Second, when f1 < f < f2, we get B   K < s1
F < B   K=2 so that there exists an
equilibrium in the support of conguration (ii). Furthermore, we still have s2
F < B  K=2
which implies that there exists no pure exporter equilibrium in the support of conguration
(i). Therefore, the unique equilibrium involves multinationals and exporters.
Third, when f2 < f < f3, we get B   K=2 < s1
F so that there exists no equilibrium
in the support of conguration (ii). Furthermore, we still have s2
F < B   K=2 which
implies that there exists no pure exporter equilibrium in the support of conguration (i).
Equilibria of the subsidy game belong to the border between congurations (i) and (ii).
There thus exists a continuum of equilibria such that (sH;sF) = (s;2B   K   s) where
s 2 [maxfs2
F;2B   K   s1
Fg;minfs1
F;2B   K   s2
Fg].
Last, when f  f3, we get B   K=2 < s1
F so that there exists no equilibrium in
the support of conguration (ii), whereas we now have s2
F  B  
K
2 which implies the
existence of a pure exporter equilibrium in the support of conguration (i). This is the
unique equilibrium.
Appendix 4: Absentee shareholders




F) in the case
where H = F = 0. This yields
s
1








L (b + c)
2(9c + 14b)a    (c2 + 11cb + 14b2)
(8b + 5c)(2b + c)
s
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L (b + c)
2(11c + 18b)a    (c + 6b)(2c + 3b)














F > B  
K
2









F > B  
K
2




2(2c + 3b)a    (c + 3b)(b + c)
(2b + c)
2 :
It is readily veried that f1 < f3 < f2, i.e., when compared to the case with full
prot redistribution, the thresholds f2 and f3 get reversed. The equilibrium conditions
are the same as in Appendix 3. Note, on the one hand, that the continuum of equilibria
disappears because f3 < f2. On the other hand, the supports of pure exporter equilibria
(f  f3) and of mixed equilibria (f 2 (f1;f2)) now overlap. Hence, there exist multiple
equilibria for f 2 (f2;f3).
34Appendix 5: Ownership asymmetries





cL(b + c)(12b + c(7   4F))(16b + c(9   4F))2
8(2b + c)(12b + c( 2F   2H + 7))2 > 0:
Some further computations show that
@e sH
@H
< 0 () f >
(b + c)L( 4a + 10b + 3c)
16(2b + c)
 f: (27)
For a mixed conguration to be feasible in the rst place, f must lie above the threshold
f1, which in the case of absentee shareholders is now given by:
f1 =
(b + c)L(8a(3b + c(2   H))   (2b + c)(6b + c(7   4H)))
16(2b + c)2 (28)
One can check that f < f1 for all 0  H  1, which allows us to conclude that
@e sH=@H < 0.
We next prove part (ii) of Proposition 8. Some longer computations reveal that, the






c(b + c)L(H   F)2
24b + 2c(7   2F   2H)
 0
since we assume that H  F. This expression decreases with smaller trade costs.
Furthermore, in the mixed equilibrium we have
e sH   e sF =
c(H   F)[(b + c)(10b + 3c)L2   4a(b + c)L   16(2b + c)f]
4(8b + c(5   2F))(8b + c(5   2H))
which is negative if and only if f < f, where f is dened above. Since f < f1 and f1 < f
in mixed congurations, we get e sH   e sF < 0. It can furthermore be shown that e sH   e sF



























































































e sH b sH(sF)
(d)
Figure 3: Evolution of equilibria for f = 1, f = 1:2, f = 1:275 and f = 1:4
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